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Inhibitory Control in Memory: Evidence for Negative Priming in Free Recall 
 
Abstract 
Cognitive control mechanisms—such as inhibition—decrease the likelihood 
that goal-directed activity is ceded to irrelevant events. Here, we use the action of 
auditory distraction to show how retrieval from episodic long-term memory is 
affected by competitor inhibition. Typically, a sequence of to-be-ignored spoken 
distracters drawn from the same semantic category as a list of visually-presented to-
be-recalled items impairs free recall performance. In line with competitor inhibition 
theory (Anderson, 2003), free recall was worse for items on a probe trial if they were 
a repeat of distracter items presented during the previous, prime, trial (Experiment 1). 
This effect was only produced when the distracters were dominant members of the 
same category as the to-be-recalled items on the prime. For prime trials in which 
distracters were low-dominant members of the to-be-remembered item category or 
were unrelated to that category—and hence not strong competitors for retrieval—
positive priming was found (Experiments 2 & 3). These results are discussed in terms 
of inhibitory approaches to negative priming and memory retrieval.     
 
Keywords: Inhibition, Distraction, Negative Priming, Semantic Relatedness, Free 
Recall  
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The notion that coherent cognitive functioning involves the inhibition of 
currently irrelevant or unwanted information has played a prominent role in 
explanations of a wide range of processes including perceptual selection (Tipper, 
1985), reasoning and text processing (Dempster, 1991), language comprehension and 
production (Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996), retrieval from long-term semantic memory 
(Johnson & Anderson, 2004; Wentura & Frings, 2005) and from working memory 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1988). However, both the notion of cognitive inhibition and the 
situations in which it might be employed remain controversial (Gorfein & McLeod, 
2007). The present article informs this debate by addressing the idea that attentional 
selectivity during free recall might be achieved in part through competitor inhibition 
(e.g., Anderson, 2003). 
Previous work has demonstrated a semantic auditory distraction or between-
sequence semantic similarity effect in the free recall of visually-presented items when 
they are accompanied  by to-be-ignored auditory distracters (Beaman, 2004; Neely & 
LeCompte, 1999). A sequence of auditory distracters (e.g., “robin, sparrow, 
crow…etc.”) drawn from the same category as a concurrent list of visual to-be-
recalled items (e.g., “peacock, cuckoo, kestrel…etc.”) produces more disruption to 
free recall of the visual items than categorically-unrelated auditory distracters (e.g., 
“apple, banana, pear….etc.”; Marsh, Hughes, & Jones, 2008). A plausible explanation 
for this impairment is that representations of auditory distracter items compete with 
similar representations of visual to-be-recalled items for retrieval. Of interest here is 
whether inhibitory processes are deployed in the face of such competition. 
Consistent with this idea, there is evidence that even in the absence of 
distracters, inhibitory processes are employed as a form of cognitive control in 
episodic memory tasks. In a procedure known as the retrieval practice paradigm, 
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participants learn a list of category-exemplar word pairs (e.g., Flower—Daisy; 
Insect—Ant) and then practice retrieval of half of the items in half of the categories. 
Using this procedure results in poorer recall in a later category-cued recall test for the 
unpracticed half of a category as compared with a matched half from a category in 
which none of the items were practiced, an empirical pattern referred to as retrieval-
induced forgetting (RIF). Inhibition of the non-practiced half, it is argued, reduces the 
activation levels of the representations, impairing the later recall of those items when 
they then need to be retrieved (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). There are striking 
commonalities in these results to the semantic similarity effects observed in auditory 
distraction. For example, semantic auditory distraction effects in free recall are 
usually found only when the distracters are high in output-dominance, that is, when 
they are strongly related to the category-cue (e.g., Fruit-Apple; Marsh et al., 2008). 
RIF is also more pronounced when the non-practiced items are high output-dominant 
(Anderson et al., 1994; Bäuml, 1998).  
These findings are consistent with the notion that, in both situations, 
distracters or non-practiced items that are high output-dominant are routinely 
inhibited but that there is no necessary requirement to apply inhibition to low output-
dominant items because they are not strong competitors for retrieval. However, the 
only evidence to date for inhibition in semantic auditory distraction is somewhat 
indirect and relies upon a correlation observed between intrusion errors in a free recall 
protocol and poor performance on a working memory measure commonly supposed 
to reflect attentional control and inhibitory capability (Beaman, 2004). Here, it is 
useful to make reference to MacLeod’s (2007) distinction between cognitive 
inhibition as a cause—which is hypothesized—and behavioral interference as an 
effect, which has already been empirically established (MacLeod, 2007, pp. 14-15). 
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Defining an effect as “inhibition” on the basis of behavioral interference effects risks 
circularity if the interference effects are themselves cited as evidence for inhibition 
(Klein & Taylor, 1994) and it is particularly problematic if alternative, non-inhibitory, 
explanations of the behavioral effect are available.  
Accordingly, we refer to the behavioral data as “interference” and reserve the 
term “inhibition” for the hypothetical cause. Although other possible accounts will be 
considered, we proceed from the initial assumption that particular interference effects 
are the result of a particular type of inhibitory process and make predictions based 
upon this premise. This is in line with suggestions that, in the absence of an 
observable link between neural inhibition and particular interference effects, cognitive 
psychology may rely upon the power of converging evidence to inform debates about 
when behavioral interference can be ascribed to cognitive inhibition (Klein & Taylor, 
1994, p. 146). As noted by Healey, Campbell, Hasher, and Ossher (2010), a 
distinguishing feature of inhibition is that it acts not upon the to-be-remembered item 
but upon the competitors. Accordingly, a more direct approach than taken by Beaman 
(2004), therefore, is to examine the hypothesis that if distracters undergo a process of 
inhibition there should be enduring consequences, over a relatively long time-scale, of 
that inhibition.  
The notion that attempts to exclude semantic auditory distractors from the 
current memory set might have negative implications for their future processing—
and, in so doing, potentially reveal the action of an inhibitory process—is inspired, in 
part, by the observed similarities between RIF and semantic auditory distraction. 
However, there are also differences between the consequences of RIF and directed 
forgetting and the effects of semantic auditory distraction. One notable difference 
between RIF and semantic auditory distraction is that in the former the act of 
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practicing recall of the cued items is assumed to be the cause of poorer subsequent 
recall of the uncued items, which participants are never specifically told to ignore or 
inhibit (Anderson et al., 1994) whereas there is no explicit cue to “practice” recall of 
to-be-recalled lists in investigations of auditory distraction effects and participants are 
specifically instructed to ignore anything they might hear. Similarly, directed 
forgetting differs from semantic auditory distraction in that if the participant is re-
exposed to the to-be-forgotten items prior to final recall, directed forgetting—which 
we take to be closely related to RIF—does not occur (Basden, Basden & Gargano, 
1993; Bjork & Bjork, 1996).  
It is not clear, given these methodological objections, whether an ongoing 
consequence of distracter inhibition can be established. The most obvious means of 
revealing the action of inhibition in semantic auditory distraction is to ask participants 
to ignore the distracter items initially and then test whether processing of those 
representations is impeded when they are re-presented as to-be-remembered items on 
a subsequent trial. This is also the procedure used to investigate possible inhibitory 
effects in perceptual selection: slowed responding to a target that was previously a to-
be-ignored distracter—or “negative priming” (Tipper, 1985)—has often been taken to 
reflect inhibition of the distracter (for a review, see Tipper, 2001). However, this 
procedure necessarily involves re-presenting the to-be-ignored items in a way that, in 
past studies, often eliminated the directed forgetting effect for to-be-forgotten items 
(e.g., Basden et al., 1993). However, Bjork and Bjork (1996) also showed that when 
the task does not require access to the context of the original study episode, inhibition 
(i.e., an interference effect) for the to-be-forgotten items remains. Similarly, in the 
retrieval-practice paradigm, RIF has been shown to occur on implicit memory tests 
that re-present the original items (Perfect, Moulin, Conway & Perry, 2002) and it is 
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possible to argue that the kind of inhibition considered here has more in common with 
RIF than with directed forgetting (for example, both involve strong semantic 
components).  
Perhaps because of these complications, the negative priming approach is not 
typically applied to investigations of memory retrieval. Hughes and Jones (2003) 
nevertheless utilized it to test short-term memory for serial order, and found that re-
presenting sequences as to-be-recalled lists that were previously presented as to-be-
ignored distracter lists interfered with participants’ memory for serial order. That is, if 
a list such as 8-4-9-2-1 was presented first as an auditory distracter on trial n and then 
as a visual to-be-recalled sequence on trial n+1, recall of the order of these digits was 
impaired on trial n+1 relative to a control condition where 8-4-9-2-1 had not 
previously been encountered. The negative priming effect reported by Hughes and 
Jones (2003) appears to stand in contrast to the “release from inhibition” (lack of 
directed forgetting) reported when to-be-forgotten items are re-presented (see Bjork, 
1989). Perhaps an important difference between Hughes and Jones (2003) and the 
directed forgetting procedure is that the “re-presentation” of a sequence of items in 
Hughes and Jones’ (2003) procedure is always contrasted with a condition in which 
the items were also repeated, although their position within the sequence differed 
from that previously experienced. So, “release from inhibition” may have occurred at 
the item level, but not at the level of the sequence.   
Few studies other than that of Hughes and Jones (2003) have systematically 
examined the effect of actively ignoring a sequences of distracter—arguably the most 
common source of distraction in many environments (Beaman, 2005)—on future 
recall of those distracters. Extending this approach beyond the relatively narrow 
confines of short-term memory for serial order, here we use a category-exemplar free 
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recall task to further test the possible involvement of inhibition in auditory distraction 
by measuring the impact of ignoring auditory distractors on their later recall. Based on 
the competitor inhibition approach, we predict that when lists ofto-be-remembered 
items are presented alongside semantically-related auditory distracters, the same 
distracters should be poorly recalled when they are immediately repeated, on the next 
trial, as to-be-remembered items. In line with Tipper’s (2001) arguments concerning 
perceptual selectivity, we assume that competition exists between distracter and to-be-
recalled lists. The consequences of any inhibition applied in the face of such 
competition, as in perceptual selectivity and RIF, may be relatively long-lasting for 
some of the competitors involved (Grison, Tipper, & Hewitt, 2007; Treisman & 
DeSchepper, 1996). In effect, if inhibition is implicated in the free recall of items 
under auditory distraction then negative priming (NP) should be found for to-be-
recalled items that have recently been encountered as distractors. The exact timing of 
this process (whether it occurs during study, rehearsal, or test) is not examined here 
and does not materially affect the conclusions drawn. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-two students at Cardiff University took part in the study. All reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing, and spoke English as their 
first language. They received course credit for their participation. Data for two 
participants was incomplete due to equipment failure, and they were excluded from 
the analysis. 
Materials & Design 
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The experiment was run using Superlab Pro (Cedrus Corporation) software. 
Thirty words, taken from positions 1 to 30, were chosen from each of 54 semantic 
categories in the Van Overschelde, Rawson and Dunlosky (2004) category norm lists. 
Each participant received 54 trials comprising one list of 15 visually to-be-
remembered words per trial. Half of these were designated as prime trials, and half as 
probe trials.  
Prime trials. On prime trials, 15 auditorily-presented to-be-ignored words 
(distracters) were presented alongside the to-be-remembered items. To-be-
remembered items were presented, one item at a time, on the computer screen in 
lower-case 72-point Times font on a white background at a rate of one every 1.5 s 
(750 ms on, with a 750 ms inter-stimulus interval; ISI). Auditory distracters were 
presented synchronously with visual to-be-remembered items at 65 dB(A) and at the 
same rate of one item every 1.5 s (750 ms on, with a 750 ms ISI). The distracters were 
digitally recorded in a male voice at an even-pitch and sampled with 16-bit resolution 
at a sampling rate of 44.1 KHz using Sound Forge 5 software (Sonic Inc., Madison, 
WI, 2000). In 18 of these trials, the distracter lists were semantically-related to the to-
be-remembered lists. To achieve this, items from odd ranked positions in the Van 
Overschelde et al. (2004) category norm lists were assigned to the to-be-remembered 
lists and items from even positions were assigned to the distracter lists (e.g., for the 
category “fruit”, the to-be-remembered lists would be {apple [1], banana [3], pear [5] 
etc} and the distracters would be {orange [2], grape [4], peach [6] etc}). On the 
remaining prime trials, the auditory distracter items were drawn from a categories 
other than those from which the to-be-remembered items were drawn (e.g., if the to-
be-remembered list was from the category “fruit”, as above, the distracter list might 
be from the category “flowers”, giving the items {daisy [2], lily [4], daffodil [6] etc}). 
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Within lists, all items were randomized with respect to their original ranked positions 
in the Van Overschelde et al (2004) norms. This random order was the same for all 
participants.  
To-be-remembered category lists were also presented to participants in one of 
two orders (e.g., half the participants might have the category “fruit” as the basis for 
the to-be-remembered items on trial 1, and half might have the category “sport”). The 
presentation of distracters that were related or unrelated to these lists was 
counterbalanced across participants such that any given category was presented 
equally often in the presence of related distracters and unrelated distracters (resulting 
in four possible combinations across participants for trial 1: fruit (to-be-remembered)-
fruit (to-be-ignored); fruit (to-be remembered)-sport (to-be-ignored); sport (to-be-
remembered)-sport (to-be-ignored); sport (to-be-remembered)-fruit (to-be-ignored)). 
Probe trials. A prime trial with auditory distracters accompanying the visual 
to-be-remembered list (27 of the 54 trials) was always immediately followed by a 
probe trial with no accompanying auditory distracters (the remaining 27 trials). The 
visually-presented list of to-be-remembered items on 18 of these probe trials exactly 
replicated the auditorily-presented list of distracter items from the preceding prime 
trial (ignored repetition trials). These ignored repetition probe trials always followed 
prime trials in which the auditory distracters and to-be-remembered lists were 
semantically-related.  
On 9 probe trials that acted as a control condition, the to-be-remembered list 
comprised items were from a different category to the to-be-remembered list on the 
previous trial. They were instead taken from the same semantic category as the 
auditory distracters on the previous trial but were not a repetition of those distracters 
(see Figure 1). For these trials, the to-be-remembered items were drawn from the even 
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positions of the semantic category previously heard as an auditory distracter. For 
example, if the distracters came from the odd positions of the category “animals” 
within the Van Overschelde et al. (2004) norms (dog[1], horse[3]…) then the to-be-
remembered items on an unprimed “probe” trial would be cat[2], bear[4] and so on. 
Thus, the semantic categories—but not items—were repeated across prime and probe 
lists in all conditions. Pairs of trials were arranged such that there were no more than 
two pairs of trials from the same condition (no-repetition or ignored repetition) in a 
row. A schematic of the basic experimental design (which remained largely 
unchanged across all three experiments) is provided in Figure 1. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 1 here please 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Procedure 
Participants were seated at a distance of approximately 60 cm from the PC 
monitor in a screened-off testing cubicle and wore headphones throughout the 
experiment. Participants began by reading standardized instructions explaining that 
they would be presented with lists of words to read and recall and they were told 
specifically that they would not be asked anything about any distracter words they 
might hear at any point during the experiment. They were given response booklets in 
which to recall as many words from each visually-presented list as possible (a grid 
was provided with space for the 15 words presented as to-be-remembered items on 
each trial).  
The words in the to-be-remembered lists were presented one at a time on the 
computer screen and after all 15 words in the list had been presented, the computer 
displayed the prompt “recall” on the screen. Participants then had 30 s to write down 
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on the response sheets, in any order, as many of the words as they could recall. After 
this 30 s recall period a tone in the headphones signaled the end of the trial. Pressing 
the space bar initiated presentation of the next list. One practice trial (in quiet) was 
given at the start of the experiment after which participants had the opportunity to ask 
any questions before the main trials began. 
Results 
Responses were scored according to a free recall criterion, an item was scored 
as correct regardless of its position and mean recall rates for each trial were 
calculated. As shown in Figure 2, the between-sequence semantic similarity effect 
previously reported (poorer recall in the related vs. unrelated speech condition in the 
prime trials) was replicated, and analysis shows the difference to be statistically 
significant, t(39) = -5.56; CI.95 = -.058, -.027, p < .001. 
Of greater interest, analysis of the probe trials shows that items that were a 
repeat of the distracters on the prime trial were more poorly recalled than different 
exemplars of the same semantic category as the previous set of distracters (ignored 
repetition trials vs. no repetition on the probe trials), t(39) = -4.11; CI.95 = -.044, -.015, 
p < .001. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 2 here please 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 are, to our knowledge, novel in demonstrating a 
negative priming effect in free recall of multi-item lists and are also novel in showing 
cross-modal NP accruing to the visual re-presentation of items that were previously 
auditory distracters (but see Buchner, Zabal, & Mayr, 2003, for a demonstration of 
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cross-modal NP on a categorization task). To-be-remembered lists comprising items 
that had been competitors for retrieval during the previous free recall trial were more 
poorly recalled than non-repeated lists. This is consistent with Hughes and Jones’ 
(2003) data and is in line with the idea that competing irrelevant items are subject to 
inhibitory control so as to facilitate successful retrieval of the concurrent to-be-
remembered items.  
The results of Experiment 1, while consistent with past data and in line with 
predictions, nonetheless raise a number of questions. One question arises from the 
similarities and differences already highlighted between RIF, directed forgetting, and 
the present paradigm. From one standpoint, the results reported here are unexpected in 
view of the finding that, in the context of directed forgetting, re-presentation of the 
items from a to-be-forgotten list in a recognition memory test (sometimes as lures on 
that test) produces, in final recall test, performance equivalent to that for to-be-
recalled items, an effect interpreted as “release from inhibition” (Bjork, 1989). The 
NP procedure adopted here necessitates re-presentation of the auditory distracters, 
albeit as to-be-recalled items in an immediate free recall test, not as items in a 
recognition memory test followed by a subsequent final recall. This procedural 
difference may be critical since release from inhibition might occur not as a simple 
result of re-presentation of the items, but because of their reappearance specifically 
within the context of a recognition test (Bjork & Bjork, 1996). Verde and Perfect 
(2011) review inconsistencies in the empirical findings from studies of RIF with 
recognition and argue for a “transfer-appropriate forgetting” framework, in which an 
interference effect only occurs upon re-exposure to the original context in which 
inhibition occurred (Perfect, Stark, Tree, Moulin, Ahmed, & Hutter, 2004). From this 
perspective, an interpolated recognition task might provide a sufficient shift in context 
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(i.e., where the items themselves have appeared in a different context) to allow for 
release from inhibition in a final free recall task. In the current setting, however, there 
has been no such obvious shift in context from one trial to the next, which takes place 
only a few seconds later, participants are attempting to encode for future recall a 
visually-presented list that is only gradually revealed to them, one item at a time. 
Possibly also of importance, this procedure is repeated several times over, again 
contributing to the contextual similarity between prime and probe trials. 
In contrast, a reason for expecting to see the results observed in Experiment 1 
is that—as noted earlier—both RIF and the semantic auditory distraction effect (the 
difference between semantically related and unrelated distracters at prime) are 
moderated by the output dominance of the unpracticed items/auditory distracters, the 
strength of the relationship between these items and the parent category from which 
they are drawn (Anderson et al., 1994; Bäuml, 1998; Marsh et al., 2008). If this 
analogy between the two effects continues to hold, then one might also anticipate that 
negative priming will likewise be diminished if the output dominance of the auditory 
distracters is reduced.  
This prediction is theoretically as well as empirically grounded and serves to 
distinguish between the competitor inhibition account and a particular form of 
retrieval-based interference account. A study by Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) 
showed, using a more standard NP design, that the negative priming of visually-
presented nonsense shapes persists over long periods of time (up to a month). These 
results were interpreted in terms of implicit memory tokens, with action tags attached 
(ignore or attend). When a token is retrieved, the action tag attached is probably the 
most recent one (resulting, on average, in a negative priming effect that is only slowly 
diluted over time). This elegant and appealing account makes no direct reference to 
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inhibition and is similar to other episodic retrieval accounts of NP (e.g., Neill & 
Valdes, 1992; Neill, 2007) which make equivalent assumptions that recall of the 
prime items includes recall of how the items were processed when last encountered 
and it is recall of this associated activity that impairs—or in the case of positive 
priming, facilitates—subsequent processing (Neill, 2007). Since recall of the auditory 
distracter items necessarily includes recall of the instruction to ignore or withhold a 
response from them, these accounts predict that the effects of negative priming should 
persist for any memory token to which an “ignore” action tag is attached (i.e., any 
previous auditory distracter). 
In contrast, the competitor-inhibition account supposes that the relationship at 
prime between the to-be-ignored auditory distracters and the to-be-recalled lists is 
important. Representations of items that are high output-dominant exemplars of a 
taxonomic category (e.g., “banana”, “orange”, and “apple” for “Fruit”) should 
compete more strongly with to-be-recalled items from the same category, and hence 
require more inhibition at prime, than items lower in output-dominance (e.g., “guava”, 
“papaya”, and “blackcurrant” for “Fruit”). The competitor inhibition account thus 
makes the prediction that such highly competitive items will be more disruptive to 
free recall on prime trials than auditory distractors from the same semantic category 
but low in output-dominance (as previously observed, Marsh et al., 2008, Experiment 
4). However, it also makes the, as yet untested prediction that NP should also be 
greater for to-be-remembered items that were previously high output-dominant 
distracters than to-be-remembered items that were low output-dominant distracters. 
Finally, Experiment 2 also provides a check on whether the negative priming 
effect observed in Experiment 1 was driven by a repetition of order information rather 
than item information per se. Since, in Experiment 1, the order of the items presented 
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as distracters—not just the items themselves—was repeated when they later became 
to-be-remembered items, it is possible that, notwithstanding the free nature of the 
recall task, it is the order of the items (e.g., the sequential relations between irrelevant 
items), rather than the items themselves, that is inhibited. Hughes and Jones (2003) 
found that serial recall of visually-presented digits was poorer if the same sequence 
(same items, same order) was presented on the previous trial as an irrelevant auditory 
sequence and Beaman and Jones (1998) reported evidence that serial order of 
presentation might be used as a cue to support even nominally “free” recall (see also 
Bhatarah, Ward, & Tan, 2008; Ward, Tan, & Grenfell-Essam, 2010). To exclude the 
possibility that the NP effect of Experiment 1 represents merely a replication, in a 
different task, of the inhibition of order previously reported by Hughes and Jones 
(2003), in the ignored-repetition condition of Experiment 2, the serial order of the 
distracters on the prime trial and the serial order of those same items presented as to-
be-remembered items on the probe trial differed.  
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four students at Cardiff University took part in the study in exchange for 
course credit. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing 
and were native English speakers. None had participated in Experiment 1. Participants 
were randomly divided into two 32-participant groups, high output-dominant 
distracters or low output-dominant distracters. 
Materials & Design 
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Eighteen of the pairs of category -exemplars used in Experiment 1 were used 
in Experiment 2. For each category, items from output positions 1-15 from the Van 
Overschelde et al. (2004) category-norms were the higher output-dominant set and 
items from output positions 16-30 were the lower output-dominant set. 
Participants assigned to the high output-dominant distracter condition received 
lower output-dominant items as to-be-remembered lists and the higher-dominant 
items as distracters at prime, and then the high output-dominant items as to-be-
remembered lists at probe. Participants assigned to the low output-dominant distracter 
condition received high output-dominant items as to-be-remembered lists and the 
lower output-dominant items as distracters at prime, and then the lower output-
dominant items as to-be-remembered lists at probe.  
For each group there were 36 trials. There were 9 control (no repetition) 
prime-probe pairs (18 trials in total) and 9 ignored repetition prime-probe pairs. In the 
ignored repetition condition, we re-randomized the order of the items within the lists 
for the probe trial, taking particular care to ensure that, having done so, items that 
were neighbors when presented as part of the distracter list were no longer neighbors 
when those same items were presented as part of the to-be-remembered list at prime. 
Other aspects of the method were the same as Experiment 1 . The order in which 
“related” and “unrelated” speech was presented in prime trials was counterbalanced 
by alternating related and unrelated speech with half the participants starting with 
related speech at prime and half with unrelated. 
 
Results 
Figure 3 (upper panel) displays the results of the auditory distraction 
manipulation on the prime trials. This figure shows that the semantic auditory 
distraction effect (unrelated vs. related prime trials) is found only when distracters are 
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high output-dominant (thus replicating Marsh et al., 2008, Experiment 4). A 2 (Prime 
Type: Unrelated vs. Related) × 2 (Distracter Dominance: Low vs. High) Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) on the overall probability of correct recall confirmed a main 
effect of Prime Type, F(1, 62) = 22.53, MSE = .001, p
2 
= .27, p < .001, and Distracter 
Dominance, F(1, 62) = 5.36, MSE = .022, p
2 
= .08, p = .024. Of particular interest is 
the reliable interaction between Prime Type and Distracter Dominance, F(1, 62) = 
8.88, MSE = .001, p
2 
= .13, p = .004. 
Simple effects analyses (LSD) revealed a significant difference between the 
unrelated and related prime trials when distracters were high output-dominant (p < 
.001; CI.95 = -.07, -.03) but not when they were low output-dominant (p = .22; CI.95 = 
-.03, .01), thus confirming a between-sequence semantic similarity effect only when 
the distracters were high output-dominant. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 3 here please 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
A novel feature of the present results is that NP—worse performance on 
ignored repetition relative to no repetition conditions at probe—is only found when 
high and not low output-dominant to-be-remembered lists were distracters on the 
prime trial (Figure 3, lower panel, shows the results from the probe trials). Perhaps 
less surprisingly, high output-dominant to-be-remembered items also seem to have 
been more readily recalled across all conditions.  
A 2 (Probe Type: No Repetition vs. Ignored Repetition) × 2 (Distracter 
Dominance: Low vs. High) ANOVA on the overall probability of correctly recalled 
items revealed no main effect of Probe Type, F(1, 62) = .56, MSE = .001, p
2 
= .01, p 
= .46. There was a main effect of Distracter Dominance, F(1, 62) = 37.18, MSE = 
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.013, p
2 
= .36, p < .001, and importantly a reliable interaction between Probe Type 
and Distracter Dominance, F(1, 62) = 24.74, MSE = .001, p
2 
= .29, p < .001.Simple 
effects analyses (LSD) revealed significant differences between the ignored repetition 
and no repetition probe trials for the high output-dominant group (p < .001; CI.95 = -
.05, -.02) and the low output-dominant group (p = .004; CI.95 = -.045, -.009) but, 
critically, these were in different directions (Figure 3, lower panel): Whereas NP 
emerged when high output-dominant distracters were re-presented as to-be-
remembered lists, positive priming was produced when low output-dominant 
distracters were re-presented as to-be-remembered lists. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 indicate first that the NP effect found in 
Experiment 1 has little to do with repeating the order of the distracters when re-
presenting them as to-be-remembered items. The order of the distracters and to-be-
remembered items was changed between prime and probe and NP still arose. With 
regard to the primary goal of Experiment 2, the overall pattern of results supports the 
competitor inhibition approach: NP was only evident when the distracters were high 
output-dominant items and thus strong competitors for retrieval, consistent with the 
particular suggestion that only highly activated distracters are likely to compete with 
responding and therefore have to be inhibited (Malley & Strayer, 1995; Shiu & 
Kornblum, 1996; Strayer & Grison, 1999). Episodic retrieval-based theories, which 
assume that recall of the processing episode (the “ignore” tag) causes the NP effects 
observed (e.g., in Experiment 1), cannot account for these data. 
Our particular implementation of the various conditions of Experiment 1 (see 
Figure 1) meant that in the ignored repetition condition there was a repetition across 
prime and probe of the category from which the to-be-remembered lists were drawn 
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whereas this was not the case in the no-repetition condition. Thus, a relatively simple 
build-up of proactive interference (PI) explanation (Craik & Birtwhistle, 1971) of the 
“negative priming” results of Experiment 1 cannot be ruled out a priori. However, in 
Experiment 2, the comparison between low- and high-output dominant distracter 
conditions rules out this explanation because, in both cases, the category was 
presented twice at prime and once at probe, as in the ignored repetition condition of 
Experiment 1, and yet the interference effect at probe occurs only when the distracters 
were high output-dominant (Figure 3, lower panel) contrary to what might be 
anticipated on the basis of a build-up of PI, at category level, from prime to probe. 
Instead of being a simple function of the repetition of the category across trials, it 
appears that the relationship between the auditory distracter and to-be-remembered 
lists at prime is also crucial for negative priming at probe. Without this high-
dominance relationship, relative to a no-repetition condition, facilitation at probe is 
observed. 
Although not predicted, positive priming by repetition of low output-dominant 
distracters can be accounted for on the presumption that they are not particularly 
competitive (if at all) during retrieval of the to-be-recalled items—again as 
independently indicated by their failure to produce a between-sequence semantic 
auditory distraction effect. Ignoring these stimuli might not require inhibition, as their 
potency level is never sufficiently high to make them competitive at retrieval. Their 
presentation, in consequence, results in the kind of positive priming normally found 
from the repetition of an attended stimulus. This explanation leads to the prediction 
that positive priming should also be found for repetitions of distracter lists that are 
semantically-unrelated to to-be-remembered lists at prime, as these should also not 
compete for recall. We test this prediction in Experiment 3. 
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Experiment 3 
The ignored repetition probe trials in Experiments 1 and 2 involved presenting 
to-be-remembered lists that were previously distracter lists and those distracters were 
semantically-related to the to-be-remembered items on the prime trial. This series has 
not yet examined conditions in which distracters that were semantically unrelated to 
to-be-remembered items at prime were repeated at probe. Indeed, semantic 
relatedness between target and distracter is not a typical feature of, and certainly not a 
prerequisite for observing, NP in perceptual selection tasks (e.g., Tipper, 1985). 
However, if, as the competitor inhibition account supposes, inhibition is only applied 
when there is competition between to-be-remembered items and distracters, NP 
should not be found for to-be-remembered items that were previously semantically-
unrelated distracters. Indeed, Experiment 2 showed that to-be-remembered items that 
were previously low output-dominant distracters (semantically related to to-be-
remembered items at prime) were positively primed relative to a no-repetition 
condition. We therefore predicted the same outcome here for previously presented but 
semantically-unrelated distracters. Once again, this outcome would be contrary to the 
predictions of episodic retrieval-based accounts that assume simply that NP is caused 
by the simultaneous retrieval of memory tokens and “ignore” or “do not respond” 
action tags, rather than reflecting the consequences of inhibitory processing. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six students at Cardiff University took part in the study in exchange for 
course credit. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing 
and were native English speakers. 
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Materials, Design, & Procedure. 
 These aspects of the method were the same as Experiment 1 with the 
following exceptions: to-be-remembered items and distracter items were both always 
taken from even positions in the category-norm lists. Categories were never repeated 
across pairs of trials, a different category was presented for recall on each of the 24 
trials. There were 12 prime trials and 12 probe trials. For all 12 prime trials distracters 
were semantically-unrelated to the to-be-remembered lists. On 6 of the probe trials the 
to-be-remembered lists were identical to the distracter list on the preceding prime trial 
(ignored repetition condition). On the remaining 6 trials there was no repetition of 
distracters on the prime as to-be-remembered items on the probe (no-repetition 
control condition). 
 The categories used were those employed in Experiment 2. The condition to 
which the categories were assigned was counterbalanced across participants, such that 
any given category appeared equally often in all conditions. “Ignored-identity-
repetition” and “no repetition” probe trials were presented alternately, as happened for 
the prime trials in Experiment 2. 
Results 
Figure 4 shows a basic auditory distraction effect whereby the presence of 
auditory distracters in the prime trials disrupts recall relative to recall of items in the 
absence of speech on probe trials (Beaman, 2004; Marsh et al., 2008). We checked 
whether this effect was statistically significant by comparing performance on the 
prime (unrelated speech) trials with performance in the no-repetition probe trials 
where no speech was played. No-repetition probe trials were chosen for this 
comparison because they yield a measure of auditory distraction uncontaminated by 
any effect of repeating distracters as to-be-remembered items in quiet. The 
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comparison between the prime trials and the no-repetition probes was significant, 
t(35) = -3.192; CI.95 =  -.06, -.01, p = .003, thus confirming the expected effect of 
auditory distraction by any lexical items on category-exemplar free recall (Marsh et 
al., 2008). A meaningful comparison could not be carried out for Experiments 1 and 2 
because the necessary contrast is between prime trials where unrelated distracters are 
presented and no-repetition probe trials (in quiet). In these experiments, the to-be-
remembered items at probe are drawn from the same category, albeit different items, 
as the unrelated distracters at prime. Thus, any contrast confounds the well-
established lexical distraction effects of unrelated speech (Beaman, 2004; Marsh et 
al., 2008; Neely & LeCompte, 1999) with the effects of repeating categories— 
but not items—from prime to probe, which is likely to cause proactive interference 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and also introduces a further confound of the output dominance 
of the items in question (Experiment 2). 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 4 here please 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
More importantly, Figure 4 also shows that, on probe trials, the recall of to-be-
remembered items that were previously semantically unrelated distracters (those in 
the ignored-identity-repetition condition) is facilitated relative to a no-repetition 
control (i.e., positive priming). The comparison between the no-repetition and ignored 
repetition trials was significant, t(35) = -2.86; CI.95 =  -.04, -.01, p = .007, thus 
confirming a significant positive priming effect. 
 These data confirm the results of Experiment 2 in that they support the idea 
that ignored auditory distracters are, ordinarily, activated sufficiently to facilitate their 
later recall: a positive priming effect. Only when auditory distracters are sufficiently 
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output dominant with respect to the to-be-remembered item category is their 
subsequent recall impeded, arguably because they attract inhibition on the prime trial 
with ongoing consequences for the probe trial. 
 
General Discussion 
The results of the current series of experiments can be summarized as follows: 
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that performance on a free recall task is impaired 
when auditory distracters that are semantically related to, and therefore in competition 
with, to-be-recalled items at prime have subsequently to be recalled at probe. We have 
interpreted this as a form of negative priming (although the NP label itself carries no 
necessary implications that the mechanism underlying the effect is inhibitory). 
Experiment 2 revealed that high output-dominant distracters (strong competitors of to-
be-remembered items) produced an auditory semantic distraction effect and gave rise 
to NP, but low output-dominant items (weak competitors of to-be-remembered items) 
produced neither an auditory semantic distraction effect nor NP. Indeed, low output-
dominant distracters at prime resulted in positive priming when presented as to-be-
remembered items at probe. Experiment 3 showed that positive priming rather than 
NP occurs at probe for distracters that are semantically unrelated to to-be-remembered 
items at prime thus demonstrating that semantic similarity-based competition at prime 
was a pre-requisite for NP.  
The results of the series are consistent with the competitor inhibition account. 
The finding that distracters which were semantically related to to-be-remembered 
items at prime only gave rise to NP at probe when they were also high output-
dominant (e.g., Experiment 2) is consistent with the competitor inhibition view that 
high output-dominant items are strong competitors of to-be-remembered items for 
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retrieval. This retrieval competition is countered by actively inhibiting the distracting 
items. Although suppression of distracters aids retrieval of the contextually-
appropriate or desired response (to-be-remembered items) whilst preventing retrieval 
of the distracting items, this inhibition process impairs the later recall of those 
distracters when they become relevant (Anderson et al., 1994; Anderson, 2003).  
The failure to find NP from low output-dominant distracters semantically 
related to to-be-remembered items at prime (Experiment 2) and distracters 
semantically unrelated to to-be-remembered items at prime (Experiment 3) is also 
consistent with the competitor inhibition account. These distracters are either weak 
competitors of to-be-remembered items (Experiment 2) or non-competitors 
(Experiment 3) and should therefore not require inhibition. The results are 
inconsistent with episodic retrieval accounts of NP (e.g., Neill, 2007; Rothermund, 
Wentura & De Houwer, 2005; Treisman & DeSchepper, 1996) all of which assume 
that the requirement to ignore the distracter at prime, not the relationship between to-
be-ignored and to-be-recalled items at prime, dictates the subsequent fate of the 
distracter items when they are repeated as to-be-recalled items at probe (cf. Tipper, 
2001). On these accounts, equivalent NP effects should have been observed across all 
three experiments. 
There are, however, a number of differences between “standard” NP and the 
finding here of negative priming at recall due to previous competitor inhibition. For 
example, as noted earlier, in typical perceptual selection tasks, NP does not depend on 
a semantic relationship between the relevant stimulus and distracter.  Ignoring a green 
line-drawn picture of a trumpet whilst naming a semantically-unrelated picture (e.g., a 
red line-drawn picture of a dog), impairs later responding to trumpet despite the 
semantic dissimilarity between trumpet and dog. However, ignoring a picture of a dog 
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can produce a slowed reaction when subsequently responding to a picture of a cat, an 
outcome that suggests that while a semantic relationship is not necessary for NP in 
this setting, inhibition can operate at a semantic level (Tipper & Cranston, 1985; see 
also Dalrymple-Alford and Budayr, 1966; Neill, 1977). 
Within the current context, the requirement for a semantic relationship 
between to-be-remembered items and distracters at prime for inducing NP in free 
recall may be explained by the assumption that only the features of an internal 
representation of an object that could interfere with the coherent performance of a 
task need to be inhibited (Tipper, Weaver, & Houghton, 1994). Accordingly, since the 
goal of the category-exemplar recall task used in the present study is to encode and 
retrieve semantic representations, the inhibitory mechanism will be directed to the 
semantic features of the related distracters, as shown in Experiments 1 and 2. By the 
same token, semantic features of unrelated distracters will not interfere much (if at all) 
with the task-goal. It follows that any activation that those distracters accrue can 
remain within a semantic network and may serve to facilitate performance if those 
distracters subsequently become to-be-remembered items, as shown in Experiments 2 
and 3. This is consistent with a competitor-inhibition view which supposes that only 
highly activated distracters are likely to interfere with responding and hence need to 
be inhibited (Malley & Strayer, 1995; Strayer & Grison, 1999). 
A further difference between the current study and studies of NP in perceptual 
selection tasks is that, typically, NP is found only with conflict probes where there is a 
distracter to ignore during the selection of the repeated stimulus. When there is no 
distracter to ignore during selection of the repeated stimulus—nonconflict probes—
either no NP or positive priming is found (e.g., Moore, 1994; Tipper & Cranston, 
1985). Unlike the standard NP effect, NP was found in Experiments 1 and 2 in the 
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absence of conflict probes (that is, there were no distracters on the probe trials). 
Historically, the finding that NP only appears on conflict probe trials has been 
problematic for any distracter-inhibition account of NP because there is no obvious 
reason why the spillover of inhibition (and hence NP) should be contingent on the 
presence of further distracters at probe (e.g., Milliken, Joordens, Merikle, & Seiffert 
1998). However, a possible reason for why NP was observed in the present setting 
even with non-conflict probe relates to differences in processing demand imposed by 
perceptual selection as compared with free recall: Frings and Spence (2011) recently 
showed that NP is indeed produced in the absence of probe distracters in a standard 
perceptual selection-based NP task providing that perceptual or conceptual processing 
is sufficiently difficult at probe. The argument here is that responses to probe trials 
without distracters are sufficiently undemanding, thus rendering the NP manipulation 
irrelevant. From this standpoint, NP may have been observed in the present 
Experiments 1 and 2 in the absence of probe distracters because the free recall task is 
inherently more cognitively demanding than merely naming a single perceptual 
stimulus at probe (as in the more typical NP procedure).  
One further difference worth noting between the NP effect observed here and 
standard NP is that since the prime and probe trials each consisted of the presentation 
of multiple items—with a gap between prime and probe of 30s to allow time for 
recall—the time from presentation of any given distractor item at prime to its re-
presentation as a to-be-remembered item at probe was unusually long for a priming 
study. However, Cock, Berry, and Buchner (2002) previously reported a negative 
priming effect in sequence learning and, as Treisman and DeSchepper (1996; see also 
Grison, Tipper & Hewitt, 2005) have shown, NP can also be observed over much 
longer periods than one would might expect inhibition to last. This has been taken as 
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evidence against an inhibitory account of NP but, as Grison et al. (2005) have pointed 
out, Houghton and Tipper’s (1994) neural network model of inhibition can be 
expanded to account for these findings on the assumption that, as the model suggests, 
the expression of inhibition is co-determined by the application of inhibition to the 
distractor at prime and the reinstatement of that inhibitory state when the same 
representation is activated at probe: “the network may be reinstated into a transient 
inhibitory state just as it was on the prime display” (Grison et al., 1995, p. 1219; see 
also Tipper, 2001). 
This suggestion is particularly relevant when the dependent variable is not 
speed to respond (which measures the speed to overcome either initial inhibition or a 
“do not respond” tag) but item recall. A problematic feature of applying the episodic 
retrieval accounts of NP to the current situation that has not yet been addressed is that 
such accounts assume retrieval of the “ignore” or “do not respond” tag alongside 
retrieval of the item itself slows responding and yet, in the current study, the accuracy 
of memory retrieval—not the speed of responding—is  the variable of interest. An 
outline account which fits the current data and attempts to marry the two styles of 
theorizing can be drawn, however, based upon the suggestions of Grison et al. (2005). 
We presume that retrieval of the to-be-remembered items of the prime trial 
requires inhibition of semantically-related auditory distracters. Despite the 
requirement to ignore semantically unrelated (Experiments 1-3) or low-output 
dominant distracters (Experiment 2), which might attract an “ignore” or “do not 
respond” tag when they are encoded alongside the to-be-remembered material, there 
is no requirement to actively inhibit them when retrieval on the prime trial is 
attempted. At probe, a context is established that matches not only the trial just 
experienced (the probe trial) but also at least one trial back (the prime trial). Re-
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establishment of the contextual state as it was immediately prior to the prime 
necessarily reinstates the transient state of the system at that time, as suggested by 
Grison et al. (2005). Hence items that were active at that time—including to-be-
ignored auditory distractors—are then more available than would otherwise be the 
case. Items that were actively being inhibited or resisted during this period, however, 
are by the same token less available than they would be otherwise. Thus, the 
interference effect on memory which we have here labeled “negative priming” occurs 
at the point at which retrieval is attempted because of a backward-acting reinstatement 
of past context, as assumed by episodic retrieval theories of NP. However, the NP 
itself is only apparent if inhibition was actively applied during the earlier episode, as 
assumed by inhibitory theories of NP and RIF (for an extensive discussion of the 
reciprocal relationship between inhibition at prime and episodic retrieval at probe, see 
Tipper, 2001). 
The circumstances in which NP was and was not produced in the present 
experiments may also shed light on the mechanism underpinning semantic auditory 
distraction and, more specifically, whether such distraction is not a unitary 
phenomenon but instead determined by more than one mechanism. We have 
conjectured previously (Marsh et al., 2008) that semantic auditory distraction may, at 
least in part, reflect an overhead of deploying inhibition so as to prevent a catastrophic 
failure to select the correct sequence of stimuli when the irrelevant stimuli are 
plausible candidates for retrieval. For example, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
having to inhibit the irrelevant word ‘apple’ could incur a cost to the correct retrieval 
of, e.g., ‘tomato’, due to inhibition spreading from the distracter through a semantic 
network that traverses the vegetable-fruit distinction (cf. Neumann & DeSchepper, 
1992; note that ‘tomato’ in this example is categorized as a vegetable according to its 
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everyday use in cooking, not according to its scientific classification). That both the 
semantic distraction effect and the NP effect were greater/only produced with highly 
competitive distracters is clearly in line with this view: the more competitive the 
distracters, the more they would need inhibiting. This would in turn cause a greater 
overhead for concurrent processing (semantic distraction) and the legacy of such 
inhibition (negative priming) is also more likely to be evident.  
However, a more fine-grained analysis suggests that the overhead-of-
inhibition account of semantic auditory distraction may not provide a comprehensive 
explanation. For example, the account seems to predict that, within any given 
condition, a positive correlation should be found between the degree to which a 
sequence of distracters impaired performance on trial N and the degree to which the 
repetition of those distracters produces NP on trial N+1. A check on this possibility in 
our data revealed no correlation. However, this is far from unusual: Most NP studies 
have found no relationship between the magnitude of concurrent distraction and the 
magnitude of NP (e.g., Beech, Baylis, Smithson, & Claridge, 1989; Beech & 
Claridge, 1987; Driver & Tipper, 1989; Stolzfus, Hasher, Zacks, Ulivi, & Goldstein, 
1993; although see Tipper, 1991; Tipper, Bourke, Anderson, & Brehaut, 1989).  
One possibility, therefore, is that concurrent distraction is a composite of at 
least two mechanisms: the competition itself (and failure to inhibit it) and an overhead 
of successful inhibition of the competition. For some participants—or for some 
participants some of the time—one mechanism might dominate over the other in 
terms of its contribution to the concurrent distraction effect. Indeed, the notion that 
failure-to-inhibit contributes to the concurrent distraction effect seems to be required 
to explain the finding that distraction was found from unrelated speech together with a 
positive priming effect (Experiment 3). In other words, distraction was found in the 
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absence of any evidence of inhibition in this case. To the extent that failure-to-inhibit 
and overhead-of-inhibiting  both contribute to the overall measure of concurrent 
distraction, a straightforward relationship between this effect and NP would not be 
expected. Thus, a key direction for future study will be to unpack the semantic 
auditory distraction effect into these two putative components, if possible, one of 
which should correlate positively with NP (overhead-of-inhibition) and one of which 
should correlate negatively with NP (failure-to-inhibit). 
 In sum, although there are differences between a “standard” perceptual 
selection task giving rise to NP, and the free recall situation explored here, the results 
reported here fit quite comfortably within an approach that assumes that distraction 
during memory retrieval—e.g., from strongly competitive distracters—is countered 
through inhibiting the internal representations of those competing items. As such, the 
results suggest that the mechanisms of perceptual selection and selective attention in 
retrieval from long-term memory are both sub-served by inhibitory processes. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Schematic of the basic experimental design. At trial N+1, no auditory items 
were presented. Visual items at trial N+1 were either identical to auditory items from 
trial N (ignored repetition condition) or from the same semantic category as auditory 
items from trial N (control condition).  In Experiment 1, visual items at trial N+1 were 
from the same semantic category as visual items at trial N in the ignored repetition 
condition but, for the control condition, were from a different semantic category. This 
confound is addressed in Experiment 2. The dependent variable in all experiments 
was the number of visually-presented items correctly recalled as a function of trial 
type and condition (for prime trials, distracters that were semantically related vs 
semantically unrelated to the visual list; for probe trials, visual lists that were identical 
to previous auditory distracters vs previously unheard but from the same semantic 
category as the previous auditory distracters).  
 
Figure 2. Proportion of correct recall in category-exemplar recall as a function of 
experimental condition in Experiment 1. Error bars represent the standard error of the 
mean.  
 
Figure 3. Proportion of correct recall in category-exemplar recall as a function of 
experimental condition in Experiment 2. Upper panel shows performance on Prime 
trials and lower panel shows performance on Probe trials. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the means.  
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Figure 4. Proportion of correct recall in category-exemplar recall as a function of 
experimental condition in Experiment 3. Error bars represent the standard error of the 
means.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
TRIAL N (PRIME):     TRIAL N+1 (PROBE) 
 
Visual Presentation     Visual Presentation 
To-be-recalled list: 15 items             To-be-recalled list: 15 items 
                Relation to trial N Auditory Items: 
       Identical  
(Ignored Repetition Condition) 
       Same semantic category 
(Control Condition) 
 
Auditory Presentation    Auditory Presentation 
To-be-ignored list: 15 items    None. 
 
 
Same Semantic Category 
(related speech condition)  
or  
Different Semantic Category 
(unrelated speech condition) 
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Figure 2 
 
0.36
0.38
0.40
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.50
Related-Speech Unrelated-
Speech
Ignored
Repetition
No Repetition
Prime Probe
P
r
o
b
a
b
il
it
y
 (
C
o
r
r
e
c
t)
 R
e
c
a
ll
  
                                                                                Inhibitory Control in Memory     44 
               Figure 3. 
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